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and
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ABSTRACT
In the present study we investigate the effects of leverage and growth opportunities on the extent of
hedging under financial distress. Contrary to the theories, the results indicate that hedging and leverage decisions are
not endogenous. We also found that when the level of financial distress is low, the incremental tax benefits of debt
and growth opportunities might not be significant enough to motivate hedging. When the level of financial distress
is high, hotel reduce the overall extent of hedging as leverage and growth opportunities increase. Finally, hotel firms’
high level of financial distress might contribute to the negative relationship between management ownership and
hedging.
Key Words: interest rate, hedging, leverage, growth opportunities, financial distress
INTRODUCTION
Hotels are sensitive to interest rate risk because of their high leverage and cyclical business. Hotels have high
leverage because they are capital intensive, resulting in a huge need of external financing, which is usually
collateralized by fixed assets (Dalbor & Upneja, 2004). For example, during the 2002-2004 period, hotel firms had a
long-term debt ratio of 47% and a short-term debt ratio of 12% (Jang, Tang, & Chen, 2008), while the average ratio
of the long-term debt to the total assets for non-financial firms in the U.S. is only 23%, and 7.4% for the short-term
debt ratio in 1991 (Rajan & Zingales, 1995). With higher financial leverage, hotels naturally are burdened with
higher debt service obligations and thus more exposure to interest rate risk, especially when a large portion of
outstanding debt consists of floating-rate debt.
The hotel business is also highly sensitive to changes in the economic environment (Choi, Olsen, Kwansa, &
Tse, 1999). Specifically, Corgel and Gibson (2005) showed a strong and positive correlation between RevPAR and
London Interbank Offer Rate (LIBOR) changes. The researchers argued that when the economy is strong, the
demand for money increases, which, in turn results in a higher interest rate. At the same time, increasing leisure and
business travel would also increase hotel cash flows. The strong correlation between cash flows and the interest rate
would result in higher exposure to interest rate risk.
To manage the exposure to interest rate risk, hotels can either employ financial hedging or adjust the leverage.
The difference lies in that financial hedging mitigates the outcomes of risk exposure while leverage adjustment
directly controls the exposure itself. Nevertheless, leverage and hedging decisions are interrelated and endogenous
because of their opposite effect on financial distress (Smith & Stulz, 1985). This endogeneity between hedging and
leverage has to be considered while examining the hedging decisions of hotels.
Purnanandam (2008) showed that the relationship between financial distress and the extent of hedging is
concave. This suggests that the effect of hedging incentives could be contingent on the level of financial distress.
Therefore, the purpose of this study is to examine the effects of hedging determinants that are closely related to
financial distress under different levels of financial distress in the context of interest rate risk.
HEDGING AND FINANCIAL LEVERAGE
High leverage would lead to high probability of financial distress, which gives companies motivations to
hedge. With hedging, the firm could lower its financial distress, which in turn allows the firm to increase its leverage
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supported this positive bi-directional relationship. Leland (1998) further argued that shareholders may still
voluntarily agree to hedge ex post when the potential tax benefit of higher leverage allowed by risk reduction is
greater than the value of the agency cost of debt. Ross (1996) also argued that the tax benefit of increased leverage
could be one of the strongest benefits for corporate hedging.
Based on Jensen and Meckling’s (1976) argument, the relationship between hedging and financial leverage,
however, could be negative. They argued that shareholders could extract value from creditors by increasing the
volatility of firm value in hoping for higher probability of the “upper-tail” outcomes. In the meantime, creditors’
investment risk is also increased but the returns are still fixed. In other words, increasing firm value volatility (i.e.
not hedging) would transfer value from creditors to shareholders. This value transfer due to “risk-shifting” is
referred to as the agency cost of debt (Leland, 1998).
We propose that the discrepancy between Jensen and Meckling (1976) and Leland’s (1998) predictions on
hedging behavior could be partially explained by taking into account the level of financial distress. In lower level of
financial distress, when a healthy firm increases its leverage, the level of financial distress does not necessary follow
the steps, but the firm can still take advantage of the tax benefits of debt. This is the scenario predicted by Leland’s
(1976; 1998) theoretical model and supported by Graham and Rogers’ (2002) empirical findings.
For firms with high level of financial distress, the increase of leverage would dramatically increase the
probability of default. Under such situation, shareholders would have stronger incentives increase the volatility of
firm value. In other words, at high level of financial distress, the value associated with the call option of equity
dominates the expected bankruptcy cost borne by shareholders. Shareholders will lose incentive to hedge in order to
increase the expected value of equity (Stulz, 1996). This concave relationship is supported by Purnanandam’s (2008)
theoretical model. Therefore, we hypothesize and test whether the relationship between hedging and leverage is
contingent on the level of financial distress: a positive relationship in low financial distress and a negative
relationship in high financial distress.
H1: Hedging and leverage decisions are endogenous.
H2: Hedging and leverage decisions are positively related in low and moderate financial distress but negatively
related in high financial distress.
HEDGING AND GROWTH OPPORTUNITIES
Myers (1977) stated that issuing risky debt creates incentives for the firm’s shareholders to underinvest
because the benefits from new investments are shared with creditors. Underinvestment incurs costs in the form of
lost growth opportunities from positive NPV projects. Bessembinder (1991) argued that hedging can mitigate the
underinvestment problem because hedging reduces the probability of default, thus creditors’ sensitivity to
investment risk. This allows equity holders to capture a larger portion of the benefits from new investments. Since
underinvestment costs are most severe for firms with attractive investment opportunities (Graham & Rogers, 2002)
and hedging can mitigate the underinvestment problem, the relationship between hedging and growth opportunities
should be positive. This relationship is especially strong when external finance is costly because hedging ensures
sufficient internal funds for undertaking attractive investment opportunities (Froot, Scharfstein, & Stein, 1993).
However, empirical evidence has been inclusive. While Nance, Smith, and Smithson (1993), Gay and Nam (1998),
and Singh and Upneja (2007) found a positive relationship between hedging and growth opportunities, Mian (1996),
Geczy, Minton, and Schrand (1997), and Allayannis and Ofek (2001) found no relationship between hedging and
growth opportunities. Graham and Rogers (2002) further showed that the direction of this relationship depends on
the choice of proxies for growth opportunities: a negative relationship for research and development (R&D)
expenses and a positive relationship for market-to-book ratio.
The conflict between theories and empirical evidence may be explained by reconsidering the application
Bessembinder’s (1991) theory under high financial distress. Consider the case of high financial distress when
creditors’ claim is larger than firm value including new investments. Even if hedging can effectively reduce
creditor’s sensitivity to investment risk, shareholders’ share of the investment benefits is still zero because creditors
have a senior claim to all value of the firm. The logical response of shareholders would be reducing hedging in order
to increase the expected value of equity (Stulz, 1996). Also, for firms under a high level of financial distress,
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H3: Hedging and growth opportunities are positively related in low financial distress but negatively related in high
financial distress.
MODEL SPECIFICATION
Two-Step Hedging Decision
Many studies (Gay & Nam, 1998; Graham & Rogers, 2002; D. G. Haushalter, 2000) have used the Tobit
model to estimate the extent of hedging because it appears to be left censored. However, Maddala (2001) argued that
the Tobit model is applicable only in cases where the latent variable can take negative values and the observed zero
values are due to nonobservability. In the case of the extent of hedging, the value will not be negative and the zero
observations are not due to nonobservability, but are the result of managers’ decisions not to hedge. For such a
situation, Maddala (2001) argued that one has to model the decision that produces the zero observations rather than
use the Tobit model mechanically. Singh and Upneja (2007) also discussed the importance of using a two-step
approach to separate the decision on whether to hedge from the decision on the extent of hedging. Therefore, we
adopt a two-step procedure (Heckman, 1979) to address the sample selection bias on the estimation of the extent of
hedging caused by the decision to hedge. In the first step of Heckman’s procedure, the decision to hedge is estimated
by a probit regression (eq. 1). Based on the predicted value of this estimation, the Mill’s ratio is obtained by
calculating the ratio of the value of the standard normal density function to the value of the standard normal
cumulative distribution function. In the second step, this Mill’s ratio is added to the extent-of-hedging equation to
correct the sample selection bias caused by the decision to hedge (eq. 2). The model is specified as follows. The
definitions and discussions of the variables adopted are listed in Table 1 and the paragraphs below.

Hedger = α 0 + α 1 LEV + α 2 GW + α 3 NOL + α 4 INFO + α 5 MGT
+ α 6 SIZE + α 7 CASH + ε 1
Extent = β 0 + β 1 LEV + β 2 GW + β 3 FD + β 4 LEV × FD + β 5 GW × FD
+ β 6 FLOAT + β 7 NOL + β 8 INFO + β 9 MGT + β 10 SIZE + γλ + ε 2

Eq.1

Eq. 2

Table 1. Variable Definitions of the Hedging Equations
Variable
Definition
Hedger
1 = hedger; 0 = non-hedger
Extent
nominal value / total assets
LEV
long-term debt / total assets
GW
market value of equity / book value of common equity
FD
1 if Z-score < 0.2087; 0 otherwise
INTCOVER
EBIT / interest expense
CASH
cash and equivalents/total assets
FLOAT
floating-rate debt/total debt
INFO
common shares outstanding / common shareholders
MGT
options outstanding/common shares outstanding
SIZE
ln(total assets)
Current risk management theories do not distinguish the determinants of the decision to hedge from those of
the extent of hedging. Therefore, the extent of hedging is based on the same hedging incentives except cash holdings,
which is substituted by the ratio of floating-rate. The rationale is that cash is considered as an alternative to hedging
(Haushalter, Klasa, & Maxwell, 2007). Once the firm decides to hedge interest rate risk, the extent of hedging would
be more directly influenced by the amount of floating-rate debt than cash holdings. The product of leverage and
financial distress and the product of growth opportunities and financial distress are included in the extent of hedging
equation to test hypotheses 2 and 3.
One important variable in this study is the level of financial distress. Many studies have used leverage as a
proxy for the level of financial distress (see Triki (2005)) by assuming that firms with higher leverage face higher
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financial distress reflects the status of a firm’s financial health given the management decision and external
environment at the time. Therefore, to clearly examine the relationship between hedging activity and its
determinants under different levels of financial distress, the measurement of leverage and financial distress must be
separated. The separation also enables us to determine if hedging response to the tax benefit of debt or the reduction
of financial distress.
We used Altman’s Z-score (Altman, 1968) to construct a financial distress dummy variable (FD). A large Zscore value indicates a low level of financial distress. Using a sample of manufacturing firms, Altman (1968)
identified a Z-score value of 2.675 to separate the bankrupt and the non-bankrupt firms. However, in this hotel
sample, the Z-score ranges from -0.546 to 1.078, meaning all hotels should be classified as bankrupt firms under
Altman’s definition. Therefore, the 25% quartile Z-score (0.2087) is used as the cutoff point of classifying
financially distressed hotels. The binary variable, FD, is assigned 1 when Z is smaller than 0.2087 and is assigned 0
otherwise.
Based on risk management studies (DeMarzo & Duffie, 1995; Geczy, et al., 1997; Nance, et al., 1993; Tufano,
1996), we also include net operating loss carryforwards, information asymmetry, management incentive, firm size,
cash holdings, and the ratio of floating-rate debt to total debt as control variables.
Hedging and Leverage Endogeneity
The Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test is used to test the endogeneity of hedging decision in leverage decision
and vice versa. The DWH test compares the coefficients estimated by simultaneous equations to those estimated by
OLS (Davidson & MacKinnon, 2004). To test the endogeneity, we follow Tang and Jang (2007) to model leverage
as a function of fixed assets (PPE), growth opportunities (GW), earnings volatility (VOL), agency costs (FCF),
profitability (ROA), and firm size (SIZE) shown in equation 3. The variable definitions are listed in Table 2.

LEV = γ 0 + γ 1 PPE + γ 2 GW + γ 3VOL + γ 4 FCF + γ 5 ROA + γ 6 SIZE + ε 3

Eq.3

Table 2. Variable Definition of Leverage Equation
Variable
Definition
PPE
net PPE / total assets
VOL
moving standard deviation of 3-year EBIT
FCF
net cash flow/total assets
ROA
net income / total assets
DATA
The sample for the hotel industry is the publicly traded hotel firms and casino hotels as defined by North
America Classification System codes 721110 and 721120 respectively. The financial data are downloaded from the
COMPUSTAT database and the notional value and the direction of the position of the interest rate derivatives are
collected from 10-K filings with the keywords, “derivative,” “interest rate,” “market risk,” “swap,” “long-term debt,”
and “floating-rate.” Only firms with information on both COMPUSTAT and EDGAR are selected for the sample.
After deleting outliers and missing data, 150 firm-year observations from 45 companies are obtained from the 2002
to 2006 period. There are 73 firm-year observations from 19 hedging firms and 77 firm-year observations from 22
non-hedging companies.
Table 3. Average Holdings of Interest Rate Derivatives
Derivative Type
Mean
Nominal Value (million):
N
Floating-to-fixed rate swap
27
168.6
Interest rate cap
27
330.7
Fixed-to-floating rate swap
46
327.9
T
Scaled by Total Assets:
Floating-to-fixed rate swap
12
6.75%
Interest rate cap
9
17.15%
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Fixed-to-floating rate swap
12
6.14%

Median

Std.

Max.

Min.

100.0
197.0
300.0

191.7
376.8
254.0

738.5
1607.0
1050.0

4.0
35.0
50.0

7.19%
17.75%
4.52%

5.83%
9.67%
5.73%

22.49%
39.69%
29.10%

0.39%
2.26%
0.90%4

Note: N: number of observations;
number
Tang and T:
Jang:
Interest of
ratecompanies
hedging holding the instrument
Based on the effect on debt obligations, interest rate instruments are divided into long and short positions.
Floating-to-fixed swaps and interest rate caps are categorized as long positions (LONG) and fixed-to-floating swaps
are recorded as short positions (SHORT).
ANALYSIS AND RESULTS
Summary statistics are presented in Table 4.
Table 4. Summary Statistics and T-tests
N = 150

Mean (Std.)
Extent
0.062 (0.10)
LEV
0.432 (0.51)
GW
2.085 (7.45)
Z-score
0.340 (0.23)
INTCOVER
2.121 (3.52)
CASH
0.093 (0.11)
FLOAT
0.334 (0.34)
INFO
154.4(552)
MGT
0.089 (0.08)
Total Assets
3160 (4608)
PPE
0.638 (0.21)
VOL
46.36 (74.2)
FCF
0.005 (0.06)
ROA
-0.01 (0.17)
Revenue
940 (1326)
Note: Total assets and revenues are in millions.

Max.
0.597
1.013
23.30
1.078
30.61
0.628
1
5208
0.430
22284
0.957
435.4
0.317
0.179
6071

P50

Min.

0
0.410
1.837
0.345
1.801
0.055
0.236
11.96
0.082
1331
0.681
14.20
0.002
0.022
386

0
0
-71.45
-0.546
-9.505
0.004
0
0.976
0
6.191
0.072
0.119
-0.216
-1.874
0

As shown in Table 5, none of the DWH tests is significantly, which suggests that hotel managers are making
hedging and leverage decisions separately, a departure from theories. Therefore, hypothesis 1 is not supported and
the hedging decision will be estimated independent of leverage decision. This presents an opportunity to increase
firm value considering some of the hedging benefits are related to financial leverage.
Table 5. Durbin-Wu-Hausman Tests
All positions
LONG
Endogeneity of Hedging Extent in
0.12 (0.72)
0.35 (0.55)
Leverage
Endogeneity of Leverage in Hedging
0.42 (0.52)
0.30 (0.59)
Extent
Note: Figures reported are F-values. The p-values are in parenthesis.

SHORT
2.97 (0.09)
0.23 (0.63)

The results of the two-step hedging decision based on the Heckman model are reported in Panel A, Table 6.
The analysis is repeated for long and short positions. All three measures of the hedging extent share the same first
step equation (decision to hedge). The Mill’s ratio is not significant in all three measurements, indicating that the
sample selection bias is not serious in this sample. In such case, OLS is a more efficient estimation method. But the
adoption of the Heckman model is based on the logic that firms have to first decide whether to hedge and then
decide how much to hedge. Since these two decisions could response differently to the same hedging incentives, we
still estimate hedging decision with Heckman model to explore the possible different behaviors. The results of OLS
estimation is presented in Panel B for comparison.
The effects of leverage and growth opportunities on hedging are only significant when financial distress is
incorporated, which signals the importance of financial distress on the effects of hedging determinants. Specifically,
leverage and growth opportunities do not have significant impacts on the decision to hedge and the extent of
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opportunities are not significant enough to motivate hedging. Under high financial distress, the effect of leverage is
as hypothesized; the extent of hedging decreases as leverage increases. Therefore, hypothesis 2 is partially supported.
Table 6. Analysis of Hedging Decisions
Panel A: Two-step hedging decision estimated by Heckman model

Y=
LEV
GW
FD
LEV*FD
GW*FD
FLOAT
CASH
NOL
INFO
MGT
SIZE
CONST
Mill’s λ
Wald χ2

All positions
-0.009 (-0.08)
-0.001 (-0.17)
1.541 (4.39)
-2.138 (-3.99)
-0.019 (-1.89)
0.071 (1.32)

Extent of hedging
LONG
-0.058 (-0.95)
-0.002 (-0.39)
0.537 (2.68)
-0.704 (-2.29)
-0.007 (-1.15)
0.088 (2.95)

SHORT
0.485 (0.84)
0.000 (0.09)
1.004 (5.53)
-1.433 (-5.17)
-0.013 (-2.41)
-0.018 (-0.64)

-0.031 (-0.55)
-0.000 (-0.17)
-0.379 (-1.40)
-0.058 (-1.49)
0.665 (1.84)
-0.135 (-1.03)
94.31

0.005 (0.17)
0.000 (0.22)
-0.596 (-4.03)
-0.045 (-2.11)
0.514 (2.61)
-0.065 (-0.91)
166.90

-0.036 (-1.25)
-0.000 (-0.55)
0.217 (1.55)
-0.013 (-0.65)
0.150 (0.81)
-0.070 (-1.03)
82.24

Decision to hedge
-0.746 (-1.08)
0.007 (0.33)

-2.616 (-1.24)
0.511 (1.24)
0.001 (1.16)
-0.325 (-0.18)
0.450 (5.51)
-2.692 (-3.79)

Panel B: One-step hedging decision estimated by OLS
Y=
All positions
LONG
SHORT
LEV
0.005 (0.08)
0.013 (0.27)
-0.008 (-0.29)
GW
-0.007 (-1.52)
-0.008 (-2.17)
0.001 (0.43)
FD
-0.006 (-0.11)
-0.018 (-0.45)
0.013 (0.54)
LEV*FD
0.010 (0.11)
0.012 (0.17)
-0.002 (-0.05)
GW*FD
0.006 (1.35)
0.007 (1.88)
-0.001 (-0.30)
FLOAT
0.124 (5.19)
0.104 (5.51)
0.020 (1.80)
NOL
0.018 (0.71)
0.038 (1.98)
-0.021 (-1.86)
INFO
0.000 (1.54)
0.000 (2.73)
-0.000 (-1.34)
MGT
-0.223 (-2.14)
-0.226 (-2.73)
0.002 (0.05)
SIZE
0.015 (3.18)
0.006 (1.57)
0.009 (4.23)
LIQ
-0.024 (-0.32)
-0.028 (-0.47)
0.004 (0.11)
CONST
-0.050 (-1.24)
-0.005 (-0.16)
-0.045 (-2.42)
Adj. R2
0.258
0.340
0.117
F
5.68
7.92
2.78
Note: Figures in parentheses are the z-value for Heckman model and the t-value for OLS.
Under a high level of financial distress, growth opportunities have a significant negative effect on short
positions, no effect on long positions, and a marginal negative effect on the overall positions. The discrepancy
between the results of long and short positions might be explained by considering the purposes of hedging
instruments. Short positions (fixed-to-floating swaps) are used to reduce the interest rate exposure of in-flows (i.e.
revenue and notes receivable) while long positions are used to hedge the exposure of out-flows. When financially
distressed hotels encounter positive growth opportunities, shareholders would have incentives to reduce short
positions to increase the volatility of operating exposure (Corgel & Gibson, 2005) and notes receivables from
timeshare business in hoping to finance the growth opportunities with upper-tail outcomes. In sum, hypothesis 3 is
only partially supported.
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financial distress. This appears to be a departure from Stulz’s (1996) prediction that shareholders would want to
increase the volatility of firm value when the level of financial distress is high. However, as indicated by the
coefficients, short positions are much more responsive to the financial distress dummy than long positions do. Since
financially distressed hotels have significantly less profits and revenues, the additional short positions are less likely
for hedging away the exposure of revenue and income to interest rate risk. Instead, this might be a hint that
financially distressed hotels are using interest rate swaps to increase volatility, not hedging away risk.
CONCLUSIONS
In this study, we uncovered four unique hedging behaviors in hotel firms. First, hotels do not consider hedging
decision together with leverage decision as suggested by theories. Considering that some hedging benefits, such as
tax benefit of debt, are related to leverage, hotels could benefit from coordinating these two decisions. This also
opens interesting research opportunities in investigating the factors that contribute to this phenomenon.
Second, in the hotel industry, the hedging benefits associated with higher debt capacity and the ability to
realize growth opportunities might not be significant enough for hotels to engage in hedging when the level of
financial distress is low. Third, hotels with a high level of financial distress reduce the overall extent of hedging as
leverage and growth opportunities increase. Furthermore, hotels increase short positions when the level of financial
distress is high. Since financially distressed hotels have lower levels of revenue, the short positions are not likely
employed to hedge the long exposure arising from the revenue. This could be a hint that financially distressed hotels
use short positions to increase the cash flow volatility.
Finally, higher management ownership would results in less hedging. This may be a reflection that hotel firms
generally have higher level of financial distress and act like firms under financial distress; hedge less. These unique
hedging behaviors are the additional factors that board of directors could take into account when evaluating the
corporate risk management program to enhance corporate governance and eventually shareholder value.
The results are restrictive in several dimensions. The sample is small and limited to hotel firms. Due to certain
unique characteristics such as a high level of fixed assets and leverage, hotels’ hedging decisions might respond
differently to the determinants suggested by theories. Also, the relationship between hedging and leverage under
different levels of financial distress are estimated using static data. It could be that the hedging and leverage
decisions represented in the dataset are already equilibrium given the benefits and costs. Finally, the Z-score adopted
is based on a sample of manufacturing firms and may not best represent the level of financial distress of service
firms.
REFERENCES
Allayannis, G., & Ofek, E. (2001). Exchange rate exposure, hedging, and the use of foreign currency derivatives.
Journal of International Money and Finance, 20(2), 273-296.
Altman, E. I. (1968). Financial Ratios, Discriminant Analysis and the Prediction of Corporate Bankruptcy. The
Journal of Finance, 23(4), 589-609.
Bessembinder, H. (1991). Forward Contracts and Firm Value: Investment Incentive and Contracting Effects.
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 26(4), 519-532.
Choi, J.-G., Olsen, M. D., Kwansa, F. A., & Tse, E. C.-Y. (1999). Forecasting industry turning points: the US hotel
industry cycle model. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 18(2), 159-170.
Corgel, J. B., & Gibson, S. (2005). The Use of Fixed-rate and Floating-rate Debt for Hotels. Cornell Hotel and
Restaurant Administration Quarterly, 46(4), 413-430.
Dalbor, M. C., & Upneja, A. (2004). The Investment Opportunity Set and the Long-Term Debt Decision of U.S.
Lodging Firms. Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research, 28(3), 346-355.
Davidson, R., & MacKinnon, J. G. (2004). Econometric Theory and Methods. New York: Oxford University Press.
DeMarzo, P. M., & Duffie, D. (1995). Corporate Incentives for Hedging and Hedge Accounting. Review of
Financial Studies, 8(3), 743-771.
Fenn, G. W., Post, M., & Sharpe, S. A. (1996). Debt Maturity and the Use of Interest Rate Derivatives. Federal
Reserve Board.
Froot, K. A., Scharfstein, D. S., & Stein, J. C. (1993). Risk Management: Coordinating Corporate Investment and
Financing Policies. Journal of Finance, 48(5), 1629-1658.
Gay, G. D., & Nam, J. (1998). The Underinvestment Problem and Corporate Derivatives Use. Financial
Published by 27(4),
ScholarWorks@UMass
Amherst, 2009
7
Management,
53-69.

Geczy, C., Minton, B. A., & Schrand,
C. (1997).
Firms Use Currency
International
CHRIE Why
Conference-Refereed
Track, EventDerivatives.
14 [2009] The Journal of Finance,
52(4), 1323-1354.
Graham, J. R., & Rogers, D. A. (2002). Do Firms Hedge in Response to Tax Incentives? The Journal of Finance,
57(2), 815-839.
Haushalter, D., Klasa, S., & Maxwell, W. F. (2007). The Influence of Product Market Dynamics on a Firm's Cash
Holdings and Hedging Behavior. Journal of Financial Economics, 84(3), 797-825.
Haushalter, D. G. (2000). Financing Policy, Basis Risk, and Corporate Hedging: Evidence from Oil and Gas
Producers. The Journal of Finance, 55(1), 107-152.
Heckman, J. J. (1979). Sample Selection Bias as a Specification Error. Econometrica, 47(1), 153-161.
Jang, S., Tang, C.-H., & Chen, M.-H. (2008). Financing behaviors of hotel companies. International Journal of
Hospitality Management, 27(3), 478-487.
Jensen, M. C., & Meckling, W. H. (1976). Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership
structure. Journal of Financial Economics, 3(4), 305-360.
Leland, H. E. (1998). Agency Costs, Risk Management, and Capital Structure. The Journal of Finance, 53(4), 12131243.
Maddala, G. S. (2001). Introduction to Econometrics (3rd ed.). West Sussex, England: John Wiley & Sons.
Mian, S. L. (1996). Evidence on Corporate Hedging Policy. The Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis,
31(3), 419-439.
Myers, S. C. (1977). Determinants of corporate borrowing. Journal of Financial Economics, 5(2), 147-175.
Nance, D. R., Smith, C. W., Jr., & Smithson, C. W. (1993). On the Determinants of Corporate Hedging. The Journal
of Finance, 48(1), 267-284.
Purnanandam, A. (2008). Financial distress and corporate risk management: Theory and evidence. Journal of
Financial Economics, 87(3), 706-739.
Rajan, R. G., & Zingales, L. (1995). What Do We Know about Capital Structure? Some Evidence from International
Data. The Journal of Finance, 50(5), 1421-1460.
Ross, M. (1996). Corporate Hedging: What, Why, and How? University of California, Berkeley.
Singh, A., & Upneja, A. (2007). Extent of hedging in the US lodging industry. International Journal of Hospitality
Management, 26(4), 764-776.
Smith, C. W., & Stulz, R. M. (1985). The Determinants of Firms' Hedging Policies. Journal of Financial and
Quantitative Analysis, 20(4), 391-405.
Stulz, R. M. (1996). Rethinking Risk Management. Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 9(3), 8-25.
Tang, C.-H., & Jang, S. (2007). Revisit to the determinants of capital structure: A comparison between lodging firms
and software firms. International Journal of Hospitality Management, 26(1), 175-187.
Triki, T. (2005). Research on Corporate Hedging Theories: A Critical Review of the Evidence to Date.
Tufano, P. (1996). Who Manages Risk? An Empirical Examination of Risk Management Practices in the Gold
Mining Industry. Journal of Finance, 51(4), 1097-1137.

https://scholarworks.umass.edu/refereed/Sessions/Wednesday/14

8

